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Daniel Richman

The Past, Present, and
Future of Violent Crime
Federalism
ABSTRACT

The history of the federal involvement in violent crime frequently is told
as one of entrepreneurial or opportunistic action by presidential administrations and Congress. The problem with this story, however, is that it
treats state and local governments as objects of federal initiatives, not as
independent agents. Appreciating that state and local governments courted
and benefited from the federal interest is important for understanding the
past two decades, but also for understanding the institutional strains created by the absolute priority the feds have given to counterterrorism since
September 11, 2001. Intergovernmental relations are at a crossroads. For
two decades, the net costs of the federal interaction with state and local
governments on crime have been absorbed nationally, with the benefits
felt locally. The federal commitment to terrorism prevention and the roles
federal authorities envision for state and local agencies portend a very different dynamic, with reduced federal funding for policing and an inherent
tension between domestic intelligence collection and street crime enforcement, particularly in urban areas with a high proportion of immigrants.

It has long been a truism that, in our federal system, episodic violent
crime (street crime) is the province of state and local authorities. And
usually local authorities at that, for very few states have integrated law
enforcement hierarchies. State governments provide the preconditions
of the system: the penal statutes to be enforced and the prisons to be
filled. It is the local police, working with local district attorneys, and
county sheriffs, working with county attorneys, who have primary reDaniel Richman is professor of law, Fordham University. Portions of this article have
been adapted from the author's essay "The Right Fight," which appeared in the December
2004/January 2005 issue of the Boston Review.
© 2006 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0192-3234/2006/0034-0002510.00
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sponsibility for keeping the streets and roads safe and going after rapists, robbers, and murderers.
This responsibility on the part of states and their instrumentalities
has been enshrined in Supreme Court rulings such as United States v.
Morrison (529 U.S. 598, 618 [2000]), where the Court noted that "we
can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders
denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims." The point,
however, goes far beyond constitutional structure, which has both
shaped and been shaped by the expectations of the citizenry. Everybody
knows to call the local police when reporting or complaining about
violent crime. And those who forget will be reminded by the everincreasing stream of movies and television programs celebrating the
exploits of local police officers and prosecutors.
With this responsibility comes at least the potential for some institutional accountability at the local level (Richman and Stuntz 2005).
Not every violent crime is reported to the police, and crime rates are
certainly not a simple function of local enforcement efforts. But
whether or not a violent crime has occurred is generally undisputable.
The conceptual possibility of tracking such crimes, and the nationwide
efforts to do so via local and national statistical measures, have put
increasing pressure on the police and other local enforcement officials
to justify their performance (Stephens 1999).
In contrast, federal law enforcement officials have traditionally faced
no such pressure. Few crimes are ineluctably federal. And to the extent
that there is a federal "beat," it is one far more elusive than that patrolled by the local cops. Securities frauds, counterfeiting, corruption,
tax evasion, or espionage may not even be noticed and, when alleged,
may not have even happened. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
does yeoman work coordinating the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)
system. It does not, however, offer any measure of the "federal crime"
rate, and few would expect it do so.
One might expect a system that lacks performance measures to revel
in its unaccountability and its ability to focus on better-dressed offenders. But like a moth to a flame, the feds have been drawn to street
crime (particularly of the urban variety). The operating assumption
seemed to be that what citizens can feel and count they will vote on.
And so, at least since the 19 6 0s, the UCR crime rate has been a focus
of legislative and executive action at the federal level. The drop in the
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violent crime rate that began in 1991-92 (FBI 2004a) made little difference, and the federal commitment persisted, even intensified (Russell-Einhorn, Ward, and Sheeherman 2000, p. i).
The history of the federal involvement in street crimes has frequently been told as one of entrepreneurial or opportunistic action by
presidential administrations and Congress (Marion 1994; Brickey 1995;
Gest 2001, pp. 63-81). In quest of the political gains to be garnered
by declaring war on "real" crime-the kind that voters actually fearfederal officials strategically reached into what had always been the
province of state and local authorities. Passing laws meant to be enforced only infrequently, and cherry-picking only the best cases, these
legislative and executive officials, the critique goes, have shown far
more interest in reelection than any rational program of crime reduction (Baker 1999, p. 679).
There is some truth in this. The problem with this story, however,
is that it treats state and local governments as objects of federal initiatives, not as independent agents. This they certainly were not. The
history is not one of intrusion but of codependence. Appreciating the
extent to which state, and particularly local, governments courted and
benefited from federal activity in the violent crime area is important
not just for understanding the past two decades, but also for understanding the institutional strains created by the absolute priority the
feds have given to counterterrorism since the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks.
The goal of this essay, which draws on the deft exploration by William Geller and Norval Morris (1992) of the federal-local dynamic, is
to draw on the history of federal, state, and local relations in the law
enforcement sphere as a means of understanding present intergovernmental tensions and considering how those tensions might be resolved.
For most of the twentieth century, the principal role that federal officials envisioned state and local agencies playing in the violent crime
area was that of beneficiary. Sometimes the largesse took the form of
cash. Sometimes it came in kind, through the commitment of federal
enforcement assets such as agents, prosecutors, and judges. This beneficence may have been politically motivated and have even occasionally been unwelcome. But the limited federal ambitions and the virtual
monopoly over local knowledge maintained by local police departments ensured that the costs of federal encroachment were small and
the gains to state and local governments substantial.
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Since the September 11 attacks, the federal government has been
giving less and asking more. Although it is too soon to tell, federal
counterterrorism efforts themselves may well be drawing on funds and
resources that used to aid local crime-fighting programs. Certainly
many localities see it that way. More important, federal counterterrorism efforts threaten to place demands on local police departments that
are extraneous to and even inconsistent with their crime-fighting mission. At the heart of advances in policing theory and practice over the
past decades has been a recognition that policing will be neither effective nor politically viable without the cultivation of relationships with
communities-and especially minority communities. And many local
departments have become concerned about the toll that cooperation
with federal efforts will place on these relationships.
How these tensions will be resolved remains to be seen, and perhaps
they will not be resolved any time soon. It is equally possible that every
jurisdiction will arrive at its own peculiar modus vivendi with the federal government. Yet in the desire of the federal government to create
an integrated domestic intelligence network lies the seeds of a new,
normatively appealing relationship between the feds and state and local
governments-one in which the political accountability that comes
with local crime fighting becomes a characteristic of the entire network.
What materials does this essay draw on? The legal literature has
certainly given considerable (and usually critical) attention to the federal government's movement into the violent crime area over the
course of the twentieth century. Yet the attention has generally been
restricted to the politics behind the movement and the constitutional
issues raised by this extension of federal power into the traditional
province of state and local governments. Some scholars with more institutional concerns, such as Geller and Morris and more recently Miller and Eisenstein (2005), have gone beyond the standard speeches,
statutes, and judicial decisions, to look at how the feds actually interacted with state and local authorities; but recourse to the broader political science literature and to government and government-sponsored
reports is needed for a fuller picture on this score. Some such reports,
such as that prepared by Malcolm Russell-Einhorn, Shawn Ward, and
Amy Seeherman in 2000, and many by the Government Accountability
(formerly General Accounting) Office, are particularly helpful for peering inside agencies and police departments.
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The federalization literature rarely intersects with the policing literature, a vast and deep body of scholarship that considers how the
local police interact with the communities they protect, how this interaction promotes effective policing, and how one measures police
performance. It must, however, if one seeks to understand how the
new counterterrorism efforts have strained relations between the feds
and local police departments. And to place these counterterrorism efforts in historical context, one also needs to consult the literature on
past domestic intelligence programs, and particularly on federal efforts
to develop and direct local intelligence capabilities.
One of the challenges, and rewards, of writing a history of the present is watching the story develop and change with daily news accounts.
Distinguishing structural change from noise can be quite difficult, especially when one looks from outside at a complex negotiation. When
Portland, Oregon, withdraws its police department from the federal
Joint Terrorism Task Force, should the move be read as an announcement of local priorities or the opening bid in a bargaining process? Or
both? When the FBI promises an unprecedented degree of information
sharing with state and local authorities, is it simply pacifying congressional critics? Trying to persuade those authorities to increase a flow
that still pretty much goes one way? Or actually moving toward a system that will give state and local officials information that they can use
both to secure their communities against terrorism and to fight regular
crime? It is too soon to tell. Yet beneath the headlines, the complaints,
and the posturing, a new institutional dynamic is emerging in the law
enforcement sphere, as intergovernmental relations centered on violent
crime are challenged and transformed to meet new threats.
While it is hard for scholars to pin down the underlying realities of
a fast-evolving situation, there are some compensating factors with respect to sources. The official actors in this process are well aware of
the transformations their world is undergoing and have engaged in
wide-ranging conversations about these transformations among themselves and with the legislative and executive authorities that have monitored developments. While the reports, roundtables, legislative advocacy pieces, program guides, and other such publicly available
documents sometime need to be read with a grain of salt, they provide
valuable windows into the changing world.
Section I of this essay traces the history of the federal government's
involvement in violent crime from the founding but gives particular
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attention to the intensification of this involvement after 1964. Beyond
noting the statutory and programmatic milestones of this history, this
section examines the allure of violent crime federalism to (almost) all
the institutional entities affected by the influx of federal dollars and
enforcement personnel into an area traditionally reserved for state and
local activity. Section II tells how the attacks of September 11 challenged and disrupted this system of federal, state, and local interaction,
with the federal government reconfiguring both its enforcement and
funding priorities and placing new demands on its state and local partners. Section III attempts to predict the longer-term effects of the
changed federal priorities. It also highlights the normatively appealing
aspects of the domestic intelligence network that is being cobbled together from institutions whose previous interactions were centered on
violent crime, not terrorism.

I. Federal Involvement in Violent Crime
To the extent that "violent crime" is understood as simply referring to
crime that involves violence, the federal government has never been
uninvolved in violent crime. From the earliest days of the republic,
even the most minimalist visions of federal law enforcement power
have included some violent offenses, such as attacks on federal officials.
When used (as it is here) to refer to the murders, robberies, and rapes
of ordinary citizens, however, the term defines an enforcement sphere
that the federal government had little to do with for over a century
(except within federal enclaves). Indeed, it was not until 1964 that such
street crimes became the subject of sustained federal policy making.
Thereafter, however, federal movement into this area quickly went
from a trot to a gallop, with each new administration or congress trying
to outdo its predecessor in passing new statutes and committing funds
and enforcement resources to the War on Crime.
A. A Whirlwind Tour of Federal Involvement in Violent Crime before
1964
The framers of the Constitution did not envision that the federal
government would play much of a role in criminal enforcement. To
the extent that they contemplated substantive federal criminal law at
all, their discussions centered only on piracy, crimes against the law of
nations, treason, and counterfeiting (Kurland 1996, pp. 25-26). The
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document they produced made no effort to give the federal government general police powers of the sort states exercised. The only circumstance the Constitution explicitly envisioned as justifying federal
measures against "domestic violence" was when a state certified that
federal help was needed (U.S. Constitution, art. IV, sec. 4; Bybee 1997).
Otherwise, the only criminal justice interests that government would
have were those relating to the powers specifically delegated to it.
While the Bill of Rights gave considerable attention to the procedural
safeguards that would apply in federal prosecutions, the range of prosecutions envisioned was thus quite small. And few were brought. Between 1789 and 1801, by one count, only 426 criminal cases were
brought in federal courts, a great many of which related to the Whiskey Rebellion (Henderson 1985, p. 13; Kurland 1996, p. 59 n. 209).
In its early years, Congress was not even quick to address violent
crime in those areas in which it could have used its delegated powers.
In 1818, presented with a case in which a marine had murdered a
cook's mate while on board the U.S.S. Independence, anchored in Boston
Harbor, the Supreme Court threw out the conviction (United States v.
Bevans, 16 U.S. [3 Wheat.] 336 [1818]). Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice John Marshall explained that while Congress could have passed
a murder statute covering federal warships, it had not, and the matter
was left to Massachusetts's exclusive jurisdiction. Indeed, exclusive state
jurisdiction over putatively criminal offenses was very much the rule
during most of the nineteenth century. Congress took care to target
activity that injured or interfered with the federal government itself,
its property, or its programs. But "except in those areas where federal
jurisdiction was exclusive-the District of Columbia and the federal
territories-federal law did not reach crimes against individuals."
These "were the exclusive concern of the states" (Beale 1996, p. 40).
By the end of the nineteenth century, Congress had begun to look
somewhat beyond direct federal interests to the general welfare of citizens, passing civil rights statutes as part of Reconstruction and exercising its postal powers to address crimes committed through the mails.
Yet, save in extraordinary situations in which violence threatened these
still relatively narrow interests-as occurred when the protection of
the mails was asserted as a basis for federal intervention in turn-ofthe-century labor wars-the feds left the arrest of violent bad guys to
the states, at least where there were well-developed state governments
(Brickey 1995, pp. 1138-41; Richman 2000, pp. 83-84). In the terri-
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tories, of course, U.S. marshals and their deputies played their nowstoried role as keepers of the peace (Traub 1988; Calhoun 1990).
An effect, and a cause, of their limited role was that there were not
very many feds during this period. Agents of the postal service protected the mails (Millspaugh 1937, pp. 62-64); U.S. marshals protected
judges and performed sundry other duties (Millspaugh 1937, p. 74;
Calhoun 1990); Treasury personnel fought smuggling (Millspaugh
1937, pp. 64-68); and after its creation in 1865, the Secret Service
targeted counterfeiting (Ansley 1956; Geller and Morris 1992, pp.
241-42; Richman 2002, p. 700). But the federal enforcement establishment was remarkably small. The office of the Attorney General
dates back to the founding, but there was no Justice Department until
1870. Until then, the U.S. attorneys brought prosecutions in their respective federal districts, but with little national coordination and with
little control over how federal law enforcement personnel were deployed. Even after its creation, the Justice Department had scant resources and had to rely on Treasury's Secret Service agents or Pinkerton Detective Agency operatives for investigative support (Cummings
and McFarland 1937, p. 373; Theoharis 1999, pp. 2-3; Powers 2004,
pp. 42-61).
In the early part of the twentieth century, Congress's readiness to
enlist federal criminal law in the service of national moral crusadessuch as those against "white slavery," narcotic drugs, and, in time, alcohol-and its concerns about the challenges that Americans' increased
mobility posed to local enforcement efforts (Brickey 1995, p. 1141) led
to a substantial extension of federal criminal jurisdiction. The constitutional vehicle of choice for these enactments was the Commerce
Clause, and, at least initially, legislators generally paid careful attention
to the nexus between interstate commerce and the targeted criminal
activity. In 1910, the White Slave Traffic Act (also known as the Mann
Act) (ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825) prohibited the transportation of a woman
over state lines "for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or any
other immoral purpose." In 1914, the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act (ch.
1, 38 Stat. 785) established a comprehensive regulatory scheme for
narcotic drugs, backed with criminal sanctions. In 1919, the National
Motor Vehicle Theft Act (also known as the Dyer Act) (ch. 89, 41 Stat.
324) made it a federal offense to transport a stolen motor vehicle across
state lines, and the Volstead Act (National Prohibition Act) (ch. 85, 41
Stat. 305) sent federal agents against bootleggers and moonshiners.
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While these enactments, and the agents deployed to enforce them,
targeted many of the same bad actors who had hitherto fallen within
the exclusive remit of local authorities, the specialized nature of the
federal beat, the small size of the federal apparatus, and the alacrity
with which locals left morals enforcement (particularly prohibition
cases) to the feds kept the friction down (Hoover 1933; Boudin 1943,
pp. 261, 273-74; Langum 1994).
The Supreme Court generally accepted these extensions of Commerce Clause authority. Presented with a challenge to the constitutionality of the Mann Act, the Court found no relevant distinction
between the long-established ability of the federal government to control the movement of goods over state lines and the ability of the
federal government to address criminal conduct that had an interstate
dimension. In Hoke v. United States (227 U.S. 308 [1913]) the Court
noted that "surely if the facility of interstate transportation can be
taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of
obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of food and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the
systematic enticement to and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of women, and, more insistently, of girls" (Fellman 1945, p.
21; Abrams and Beale 2000, p. 21). This was a critical analytical move.
In an age in which railroads and cars were becoming standard tools of
ordinary criminal activity, and indeed of ordinary life, such a reading
of the Commerce Clause would in time make the limits of federal
criminal enforcement more a matter of legislative policy than of constitutional law.
A snapshot of federal enforcement in 1930 is helpful. Of the 87,305
total federal prosecutions in 1930, about 57,000 were for prohibition
violations, 8,000 were District of Columbia cases, 7,000 were immigration cases, and 3,500 were drug cases (Rubin 1934). Of the 4,345
convictions obtained in cases investigated by the 400 agents of the
Bureau of Investigation in 1930, 2,452 were for violations of the National Motor Theft Act, and 516 were for White Slave Traffic Act
(Mann Act) prosecutions (Annual Report of the Attorney General 1930,
pp. 80-81; Theoharis 1999, p. 4). The real federal activity in the violent crime area that year came in the provision of infrastructure to
local authorities. Just months after creating the UCR system as a way
of preventing newspapers from "manufacturing 'crime waves' out of
thin air," the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
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handed it over to be administered by the Bureau of Investigation
(Geller and Morris 1992, p. 283; Rosen 1995; Maltz 1999, p. 4). The
bureau's chief, J. Edgar Hoover, was quite aware of the limitations of
a system that relied on self-reporting. But any supervision, he maintained, would have to come from the IACP, not his or any other federal
agency (Hoover 1932, p. 451). The bureau's Identification Division,
also established under the "auspices" of the IACP as a clearinghouse
for fingerprint and other such data, also took care to play only a supporting role (Hoover 1932, p. 442; Theoharis 1999, p. 12).
In 1930, even as violent gangs were garnering national attention,
Attorney General Mitchell was able to say that "dealing with organized
crime" was "largely a local problem." "The fact that these criminal
gangs incidentally violate some federal statute," he noted, "does not
place the primary duty and responsibility of punishing them upon the
Federal Government, and until state police and magistrates, stimulated
by public opinion, take hold of this problem, it will not be solved"
(Cummings and McFarland 1937, p. 478). When defending the targeting of Al Capone (in which he played a significant role), President
Herbert Hoover explained on November 25, 1930, that "the Federal
Government is assisting local authorities to overcome the hideous
gangster and corrupt control of some local governments. But I get no
satisfaction from the reflection that the only way this can be done is
for the Federal Government to convict men for failing to pay income
taxes on the financial product of crime against State laws. What we
need is an awakening to the failure of local government to protect its
citizens from murder, racketeering, corruption, and a host of other
crimes" (Calder 1993, p. 144).
Then came the kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh's son in March
1932, which one newspaper called "a challenge to the whole order of
the nation" (Powers 1987, p. 175). Moving gingerly into this new area,
President Hoover asked Director Hoover to coordinate federal assistance, but his administration stressed that "it was not in favor of using
the case as an excuse for extending Federal authority in the area of law
enforcement" (Calder 1993, p. 201). National interest in the case must
have been hard to bear, however, for in May 1932, a week after the
baby's body was found, Congress passed a federal kidnapping statute,
invoking its power under the Commerce Clause (Potter 1998, p. 112).
Attorney General Mitchell complained to the president: "If this law
had been on the statute books at the time the Lindbergh case arose,

The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism
there would have been an outcry demanding that the federal government take hold of the case; the local police authorities would have
relaxed their activities and been glad to dump the responsibilities on
the federal government; we would have spent thousands of dollars with
no better results than the state authorities obtained, only to find out
at the end that no federal crime had been committed as there had been
no interstate transportation" (Cummings and McFarland 1937, p. 479).
But the attorney general still recommended that the president not go
so far as to veto the bill. And it became law (Cummings and McFarland
1937, p. 479; Calder 1993, p. 203).
The kidnapping statute was just the beginning of what soon became
a wave of congressional enactments targeting criminal behavior that
had hitherto been the exclusive province of state and local enforcers.
As the foreword to a fascinating issue of Law and ContemporaryProblems
devoted to the new federal legislation noted in October 1934:
So dramatic have been the recent depredations of organized criminal bands, enabled by modern methods of transportation to operate over wide territories, that action has been relatively prompt in
forthcoming. The aid of the federal government has first been besought-in part because with respect to certain offenses it alone is
competent to act, in part because appeal to Washington affords an
outlet for the urge for action without requiring a painstaking-and
politically painful-reorganization of state and local law enforcing
agencies. (P. 399)
The charge was led by the new president, Franklin Roosevelt, who
in his January 3, 1934, address to Congress put crime high on his
administration's legislative agenda (O'Reilly 1982, p. 642). "In the
short term," Bryan Burrough has noted, this War on Crime "served as
powerful evidence of the effectiveness of the Roosevelt administration's
New Deal policies, boosting faith in the very idea of an activist central
government. On a broader scale, it reassured a demoralized population
that American values could overcome anything, even the Depression"
(2004, p. 544).
Congress immediately responded, and within six months, 105 crime
bills had been introduced (Richman 2000, p. 87). Many passed, including the National Stolen Property Act (ch. 333, 48 Stat. 794) (barring the transportation of stolen property in interstate commerce), the
National Firearms Act (ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236), the Fugitive Felon Act
(ch. 302, 48 stat. 782) (prohibiting interstate flight to avoid prosecution
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for violent felonies), and the Federal Bank Robbery Act (ch. 304, 48
Stat. 783) (Brickey 1995, pp. 1143-44). That same year, Congress also
passed the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 (ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979), which
was intended to allow federal prosecution of the urban gangsters
thought to be flourishing around the country but was written to cover
a broad range of robberies and extortions.
Under Director Hoover's savvy leadership, the FBI rode the crest
of this legislative wave-and of the perceived "crime wave" that occasioned it-to fame and fortune. Its agents "acquired the popular
identity of the G-man: the highly professional and apolitical hero who
'always got his man"' (Theoharis 1999, p. 13; see also Potter 1998;
Burrough 2004). Yet while the number of these agents more than doubled, from 388 in 1932 to 713 in 1939 (Theoharis 1999, p. 13), the
bureau's "war against the underworld" (Whitehead 1956, p. 103) was
quite limited, and indeed was intended to be so: The idea was to go
only after those roving gangsters who had proved too big for local
enforcement, particularly those whose apprehension made (or could be
turned into) headlines. State and local officials may have chafed at a
justification for federal activity based on their own inadequacies and at
grandstanding by their federal counterparts. But they likely saw Hoover more as an entrepreneur creating a new market than as a source
of real competition. After all, while the bureau was not above encouraging local police officers (with monetary rewards) to pass information
to it about matters of federal interest (Potter 1998, p. 194), the fact
was (and continues to be) that the feds could not venture far into local
domains without the cooperation of the local enforcement hierarchy.
One study in 1945 could observe, perhaps a bit optimistically, that "the
police agencies of the central government lean strongly in the direction
of cooperation with state and local officials, and in doing so have done
much to underscore the possibilities of a cooperative federalism in this
country" (Fellman 1945, p. 24). Moreover, the federal law enforcement
remained quite small, its numbers in 1936 (excluding the Coast Guard)
amounting to about 4 percent of the nation's total police census (Millspaugh 1937, p. 283).
Local authorities got additional assurance from Hoover's oftrepeated opposition to a national police force (Ungar 1976, p. 79; Keller 1989, p. 93)-an opposition born as much from politick modesty
as from fear that any move in that direction would impose onerous
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new responsibilities on his agency. In 1954, Hoover celebrated his restraint in this regard:
I am unalterably opposed to a national police force. I have consistently opposed any plan leading to a consolidation of police power,
regardless of the source from which it originated. I shall continue
to do so, for the following reasons . . .:
1. Centralization of police power represents a distinct danger to
democratic self-government.
2. Proposals to centralize law enforcement tend to assume that
either the state or federal government can and should do for
each community what the people of that city or county will
not do for themselves.
3. The authority of every peace officer in every community
would be reduced, if not eventually broken, in favor of a
dominating figure or group on the distant state or national
level. (1954, p. 40)
Having increased precipitously in the 1930s, the federal role in prosecuting violent crime (organized or other) held steady in the 1940s and
1950s, in large part because "the overwhelming primacy of internal
security and counterintelligence matters diverted FBI resources"
(Theoharis 1999, p. 35). While it jumped from just over 13,000 inmates in 1930 (when the Federal Bureau of Prisons was created) to
24,360 inmates in 1940, the federal prison population thereafter "did
not change significantly between 1940 and 1980 (when the population
was 24,252)" (Federal Bureau of Prisons 2001, p. 3). And for a while,
"the crime issue largely disappeared from national politics" (Beckett
1997, p. 30).
A conference on organized crime convened by Attorney General J.
Howard McGrath in 1950 and the hearings of the Senate Investigating
Committee headed by Estes Kefauver in the early 1950s marked the
new (or renewed) interest of federal executive and legislative officials
in "organized crime"-usually defined in contrast to ordinary crime
but with a vagueness allowing considerable overlap. The flames were
fanned by hearings that the Senate Select Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor and Management Field, headed by John McClellan (with special counsel Robert Kennedy), held in 1958 and 1959
(Miller 1963, p. 96; Marion 1994, p. 28). These efforts, coupled with
the 1957 discovery, by local police, of the high-level mob meeting in
Appalachin, New York, put organized crime at the top of the Kennedy
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administration's (and Attorney General Robert Kennedy's) criminal
justice agenda. The only sustained efforts the Kennedy administration
made to combat violent crime of the less organized (and more prevalent) variety, however, were directed at preventing and controlling juvenile delinquency (Feeley and Sarat 1980, pp. 39-40; Marion 1994,
pp. 28). And even its ambitions in the organized crime area were limited. The head of the Kennedy Justice Department's Criminal Division
noted that "optimistically viewed . . . , the federal effort against organized crime is not merely a stopgap remedy for ineffective local law
enforcement but can serve as a catalyst in activating local officials and
encouraging them to do their share in eliminating this menace to our
national institutions" (Miller 1963, p. 103).
B. 1964-1980s: The New FederalFunding Role
Barry Goldwater's acceptance speech at the 1964 Republican convention ushered in a new era of federal interest in violent crime. Attributing the recent rise in crime rates to Democratic administrations,
Goldwater made the "violence in our streets" a focus of his presidential
campaign (Marion 1994, p. 39; Beckett 1997, p. 31). Goldwater lost
big to incumbent Lyndon Johnson, but Johnson noted how much mileage Goldwater had gotten out of the issue and soon made crime a
priority in his new administration. One response was the traditional
blue-ribbon commission-the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (President's Commission
on Law Enforcement 1967). Another was the passage of the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 and the establishment, under its
terms, of the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance to fund state and
local anticrime projects. Having "anointed himself Washington's main
conduit to local police chiefs," the FBI's Hoover looked askance at the
office's efforts, however small, to reach out to local authorities. But
members of Congress saw the benefit of a program that allowed them
to steer federal money to their constituencies (Gest 2001, pp. 18-19).
As Malcolm Feeley and Austin Sarat's study of federal crime policy in
1968-78 explains, the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance "legitimized the view that the federal government should provide financial
assistance to state and local law enforcement" (Feeley and Sarat 1980,
p. 36). And thereafter, the President's Commission "proposed that the
federal government become an active partner in combating crime at
the state and local levels" (pp. 36-38).
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In 1967, anticipating (quite correctly) that street crime would be a
critical issue in the 1968 election, the Johnson administration sought
to create a larger-scale grants program, to be run out of the Office of
Law Enforcement Assistance. As originally envisioned, the program
was to involve direct grants-in-aid to local governments-a form of
assistance often used in Great Society programs. "Since crime was perceived as essentially a local and not a state problem, the Administration
reasoned that federal assistance should go directly to those units of
local government most in need of it" (Feeley and Sarat 1980, p. 41).
It was probably not a coincidence that the nation's large urban centers-which would be the biggest aid recipients in this scheme-had
given Johnson their overwhelming support in 1964, according to Feeley and Sarat. Local leaders, of course, embraced this proposal. As
Charles Rogovin (the administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration [LEAA] from 1969 to 1970) explained, "Anticrime performance was seen by local officials as an increasingly important factor for attracting voters, and new Federal money with local
autonomy could be important in shaping positive political images.
Most local officials were also concerned about the prospect of a state
government awakened or stimulated to take an increased role in crime
control and criminal justice activity through the availability of new
Federal money" (1973, p. 11).
The administration's proposal ran into stiff opposition in Congress,
however. There, hostility to the idea of a new federal bureaucracy administering direct categorical grants-particularly a bureaucracy
headed by an attorney general, Ramsey Clark, perceived by many as
overly liberal-combined with enthusiasm for New Federalism, which
celebrated states as the primary governmental level for addressing social ills, led to the radical reconfiguration of the program into one of
block grants to the states (Feeley and Sarat 1980, pp. 42-46; Cronin,
Cronin, and Milakovich 1981, pp. 50-53). This block grant program,
enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 (82 Stat. 197), was to be administered by the new LEAA, also
created by the act. Distrust of centralized power generally, and of Attorney General Clark specifically, ran so deep that Congress put a
"troika" of three directors in charge of the new agency (Rogovin 1973,
pp. 12-13).
Without adequate means to target and monitor expenditures, the
new, toothless agency became not a force for crime policy innovation
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but simply a way of increasing funding to the status quo (Varon 1975).
For all the rhetoric of planning and coordination that surrounded the
program, the federal government's principal role was simply to write
checks (Dilulio, Smith, and Saiger 1995, p. 454).
The LEAA story is usually told as one of policy failure. That it was,
from the perspective of those looking for improved crime policies and
reduced crime rates (Navasky 1976; Feeley and Sarat 1980, pp. 144-48;
Diegelman 1982; Diluilio, Smith, and Saiger 1995, p. 455). But from
the perspective of state and local enforcement agencies eager for federal dollars without federal mandates, the LEAA was a success that
only improved with time. Its budget kept increasing, at least until 1977.
And the bureaucratic steps that stood between agencies, particularly
large police forces, and their money were only reduced over time (Diegelman 1982, pp. 998-99). "Despite the fact that the Safe Streets grant
programs were charged with inefficiency, mismanagement, and ineffectiveness, despite the fact that they had not been shown to reduce
crime, LEAA monies had become an accepted part of budgets of countless police chiefs, mayors, and governors, who now felt entitled to these
funds" (Cronin, Cronin, and Milakovich 1981, pp. 107-8).
The LEAA soon fell out of favor in Washington, attacked by Jimmy
Carter for wasting money, and finally phased out by Ronald Reagan in
1982. Reagan's 1983 budget message to Congress noted that "public
safety is primarily a state and local responsibility. This administration
does not believe that providing criminal assistance in the form of grants
or contracts is an appropriate use of federal funds" (Dilulio, Smith,
and Saiger 1995, p. 455). Under his administration, "LEAA was declared a failure, its name changed, its authorization narrowed, its appropriations slashed, and its bureaucratic status reduced-the public
equivalent of a corporate bankruptcy" (Heymann and Moore 1996, p.
107). Before its demise, the LEAA had spent $8 billion on state and
local crime control (McDonald et al. 1999, p. 12). Justice Department
components such as the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, and the Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and
Statistics-all created in 1979 by the Justice System Improvement Act
(93 Stat. 1167)-continued to provide federal support (Diegelman
1982, pp. 999-1000). But the days of large-scale federal funding
seemed to be over (Congressional Budget Office 1996, p. 10).
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C. 1980s and 1990s-New OperationalRole and Continued Funding
Yet President Reagan certaintly did not preside over the withdrawal
of the federal government from the war on crime. It would have been
hard to do so in 1980, when the homicide rate-10.2 per 100,000was the highest ever recorded in the UCR system (Fox and Zawitz
2002). During his presidential campaign, he "paid particular attention
to the problem of street crime and promised to enhance the federal
government's role in combating it" (Beckett 1997, p. 44). Moreover,
his administration's readiness to give federal agencies a direct operational role in the area suggested that its opposition to the LEAA had
more to do with fiscal policy than federalism concerns.
The idea of federal enforcement agencies playing a direct role in
combating local violent crime was hardly uncontroversial. Among the
many rocks that caused the massive effort to reform the federal criminal code to founder in the early 1970s was opposition from those who
thought it "portended the creation of a vast 'federal police"' (Schwartz
1977, p. 10). Such critics saw in the proposals of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (known as the Brown
Commission, after its chairman, Governor Edmund G. Brown of California) "the wholesale destruction of state responsibility and state autonomy in the preservation of public order and the administration of
criminal law" (p. 10 n. 32). Even FBI Director William Webster opined
in 1980 that fighting street crime "isnot our role, it's not our responsibility" (Beckett 1997, p. 52). Yet the idea received powerful support
in the 1981 report of the Task Force on Violent Crime created by
Reagan's Attorney General, William French Smith, and chaired by
former Attorney General Griffen Bell and Governor James R. Thompson of Illinois. That report called for all available enforcement tools
to be deployed against violent crime, particularly against urban youth
gangs, and called for the increased use of federal firearms prosecutors
against violent offenders (Attorney General's Task Force 1981; Specter
and Michel 1982, pp. 65-66).
The primary vehicle for this new federal operational role, at least
initially, was the enforcement of the federal narcotics laws. Explaining
why his agency needed to "assume a larger role" in the area, FBI Director William Webster-whose volte face on this score was "encourag[ed]" by White House Counselor Edwin Meese (Beckett 1997,
p. 53)-declared in 1981 that "when we attack the drug problem head
on, . . . we are going to make a major dent in attacking violent street
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crime" (p. 52). Reflecting this priority, the administration sought and
obtained massive increases in funding for the FBI's drug enforcement
work and for that of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). J.
Edgar Hoover had tried hard to keep the FBI out of the drug enforcement business, for fear of the corrupting influence the work would
have on his agents (Theoharis 1999, p. 189). Now the bureau would
join the DEA in the fray. And their focus would not be limited to those
drug offenders against whom federal enforcement offered a "comparative advantage," such as international traffickers and those involved in
multistate operations (Zinring and Hawkins 1992, p. 162). The readiness to target street dealers was in part an inevitable product of investigative tactics that worked up from the most readily arrested offenders, and in part, perhaps, of an also inevitable tendency of all
enforcers to go after the most accessible targets (Stuntz 1998). But it
also reflected the degree to which drug enforcement priorities intersected with the federal interest in street violence.
Many of the criminal statutes needed to support this new federal
operational role were already on the books by 1980: drug trafficking
offenses, gun offenses-particularly the statute making it a federal offense for a convicted felon to possess a firearm (18 U.S.C. sec.
922(g))-even racketeering laws such as the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute (18 U.S.C. secs. 1961-68), which
had been enacted in 1970 (84 Stat. 941). In any event, more were soon
passed by legislators eager to show their commitment to the Wars on
Crime and Drugs. The primary effect of this legislation, in the drug
and violent crime area at least, was to increase the sentences of offenses
already covered by federal law (Brickey 1995, p. 1145; Richman 2000).
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (98 Stat. 1837) overhauled the federal sentencing system and established a commission to
promulgate sentencing guidelines. It also beefed up the RICO forfeiture provisions, increased the penalties for large-scale drug offenses,
and established mandatory minimum sentences for the use of a gun
during a crime of violence and a fifteen-year mandatory minimum for
"armed career criminals." The Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986
(100 Stat. 449) extended the mandatory five-year sentence for the use
of a gun to uses in the course of narcotics offenses. The Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 (100 Stat. 3207), among other things, established a
new regime of nonparolable, mandatory minimum sentences for drugtrafficking offenses that tied the minimum penalty to the amount of

The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism

drugs involved in the offense (U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991, p.
9). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (102 Stat. 4181) added more
mandatory minimums. Both the 1986 and 1988 acts gave special attention to crack cocaine, which was thought to be responsible for increased violent crime rates. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1990 (104 Stat. 4789) also increased drug penalties. And the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (108 Stat. 1796)
increased the number of federal crimes punishable by death, enacted a
"three strikes" provision that required life imprisonment for violent
three-time federal offenders, and permitted the prosecution as adults
of juvenile offenders (thirteen and older) who committed federal crimes
of violence or federal crimes involving a firearm (O'Bryant 2003, pp.

3-4).
To this challenge to traditional notions of distinct federal and state
enforcement spheres, the Supreme Court's reaction was primarily one
of acquiescence. In cases such as United States v. Culbert (435 U.S. 371
[1978]), the Court made clear that the fact that criminal activity-in
this case an extortion attempt-was also punishable under state law
was of no concern, as long as there was some (often quite slim) connection to "commerce" and particularly where Congress intended such
a change in the traditional federal-state balance. Indeed, the limits that
the Supreme Court put on the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction during this period tended to be more of form than substance.
Interpreting 1968 legislation that made it illegal for a convicted felon
to possess a firearm, the Court read in an element that required prosecutors to prove "some interstate commerce nexus" (United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336 [1971]). But in a subsequent case the Court soon
made clear that all that prosecutors need show was that the firearm
had at some time traveled in commerce-something that could be easily
shown for just about any gun (Scarborougb v. United States, 431 U.S.
563, 575 [1977]; Richman 2000, p. 89).
The existence of federal jurisdiction over a great deal of regular local
crime (or at least, through the use of the gun statutes, over regular
local criminals) was already clear. What really changed in the 1980s,
however, was the readiness of the federal government to exercise its
broad jurisdiction under these statutes, to commit investigative and
adjudication resources to street crime, and to pay for the incarceration
of convicted offenders. It is hard to quantify the degree to which federal enforcers in the 1980s moved into what hitherto had been local
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cases. The number of drug cases certainly climbed, with the number
of suspects prosecuted in federal court for drug offenses going from
9,906 in 1982 to 25,094 in 1990 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1996, p.
2); but that number includes both higher- and lower-level trafficking
offenses. And while federal weapons charges can be used against street
criminals, the large number of federal weapons prosecutions brought
during this period-which went from 1,970 in 1982 to 12,168 in 1990
(Bureau of Justice Statistics 1996, p. 2)-could have had other targets
as well. After all, even an enforcement strategy targeting only organized crime or large-scale narcotics enterprises would involve the use
of weapons or low-level drug charges as a means of gaining information
or pleading out cases. By the 1990s, however, efforts by both the Bush
(I) and Clinton administrations to raise the visibility of federal enforcement operations against street criminals made the extent of federal
activity quite clear. One compelling political reason to raise this visibility was that the homicide rate, which had somewhat dropped since
1980-down to 7.9 in 1985-had started climbing again, going back
up, to 9.8 in 1991 (Fox and Zawitz 2002).
The nouns fly fast and furious here. Project Triggerlock, announced
in 1991 by Attorney General Thornburgh, directed federal prosecutors
to work with local police forces to identify repeat and violent offenders
who used guns and to prosecute them in federal court, if federal law
allowed for a higher sentence. The program's motto was "A gun plus
a crime equals hard Federal time" (Richman 2001, p. 374; RussellEinhorn, Ward, and Seeherman 2000, p. 42). In January 1992, the FBI
redeployed 300 of its agents from foreign counterintelligence activities
as part of its Safe Street Violent Crimes Initiative targeting violent
gangs and crimes of violence (Johnston 1992; FBI 2000; RussellEinhorn, Ward, and Seeherman 2000, p. 45). During the summer of
1992, the chief of the Criminal Division in the FBI's New York office
told some agents that terrorism was dead and tried to move them away
from investigating the group later responsible for the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing and into urban gang investigations (Miller and
Stone 2003, p. 84). In August 1992, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco
and Firearms (ATF)-which would soon become the federal enforcement agency most focused on violent crime-announced Operation
Achilles Heel and pledged to work with state and local authorities to
round up 600 "of this nation's most violent criminals" (RussellEinhorn, Ward, and Seeherman 2000, p. 34; Richman 2001, p. 375).
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The change in presidential administrations from Bush (I) to Clinton
did not significantly alter the trajectory of federal enforcement policy
in this area or the desire to highlight it. While there was sustained
debate on Capitol Hill about the Clinton administration's approach to
gun crimes, the only real issue was whether the federal interest in
pursuing these offenses could be served by federally sponsored state
prosecutions as well as federal prosecutions (as the Clinton administration wanted) or whether only federal prosecutions would do (as Republican opponents suggested) (Richman 2001). In any event, the priority given to firearms prosecutions continued unabated. Between 1989
and 1998, the number of federal firearms prosecutions went up 61
percent (Walker and Patrick 2000). The number of arrests by the FBI's
violent crimes task forces (in which state and local participants-whose
overtime was paid by the feds-outnumbered the federal agents)
jumped from over 14,000 in fiscal 1992 to over 25,000 in fiscal 1997
(Russell-Einhorn, Ward, and Seeherman 2000, p. 45; FBI 2000, pp.
2-3).
The most important change in federal-local interaction during the
1990s is not fully captured by these statistics, however, since it came
in the institutionalized commitment of federal agencies to take cases
that would otherwise have been pursued locally (Glazer 1999, p. 581).
The precise structure of these programs varied from district to district;
indeed such variation was a hallmark of the Clinton administration's
approach (Richman 2001, p. 383). But the trend, particularly in large
urban areas such as Richmond, Virginia, and Boston, was to formalize
collaborative relationships between federal, state, and local agencies
through joint task forces and a variety of special programs (McDonald,
Finn, and Hoffman 1999, p. 13; Russell-Einhorn, Ward, and Seeherman 2000).
In the flagship program developed in Richmond, dubbed Project
Exile, federal prosecutors made an open commitment of federal resources in February 1997: "When a police officer finds a gun during
the officer's duties, the officer pages an ATF agent (twenty-four hours
a day). They review the circumstances and determine whether a federal
statute applies. If so federal criminal prosecution is initiated" (Richman
2001, p. 379). According to the U.S. Attorney's office, the benefits of
taking these cases federally flowed from the federal bail statute, which
allows pretrial detention on the ground of dangerousness; the federal
system of mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines, which lim-
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ited sentencing discretion and resulted in predictable and substantial
sentences; and the federal prison system, which made it likely that the
sentence would be served far from home (hence the idea of "exile").
By March 1999, 438 federal indictments had been brought, and the
U.S. Attorney's office credited the program with helping reduce Richmond's homicide rate by 33 percent. President Clinton extolled Exile's
virtues in a radio address, and it was duplicated (in one form or another) around the country (Baker 1999, p. 682; Richman 2001, pp.
379-85). In Boston, a different program, dubbed Operation Ceasefire,
targeted youth gangs, getting the message out that violence would no
longer be tolerated, backing the deterrent message with prosecutions,
and also focusing enforcement attention on gun traffickers (Kennedy
et al. 2001).
Lest any violent crime prove beyond the reach of at least one federal
statute, Congress was quick to jump in with new ones. Even crimes
zealously pursued by local authorities led to new federal legislation.
After a widely publicized Maryland case in which Pamela Basu, the
victim of an auto theft, was dragged to her death while trying to rescue
her daughter from the car, Congress passed a carjacking statute in 1992
(18 U.S.C. sec. 2119). That the Maryland perpetrators were prosecuted
in state court and received life prison terms made little difference
(Brickey 1995, p. 1162; Zimring and Hawkins 1996, p. 20; Gest 2001,
p. 69). Observing the relationship between election years and crime
legislation, a former House staffer found especially noteworthy "the
amount of floor time spent repeatedly on anecdotal horrific state crimes
to justify enactment of federal law" (Bergman 1998, p. 196).
By the late 1990s, a whole body of scholarly literature condemning
the cynical politics behind this tendency to federalize everything had
developed (e.g., Scheingold 1984; Marion 1994, 1997; Brickey 1995;
Beale 1997; Beckett 1997). Sanford Kadish condemned "creeping and
foolish overfederalization," and noted how among its costs were "the
needless compromise of the virtues of federalism, the waste of resources with duplicating systems doing much the same thing, and finally, the net increase and nationalization of knee-jerk legislation" (Kadish 1995, pp. 1248, 1251). But it had little or no effect. When, in
1994, a bill was proposed that would have made almost every state
crime committed with a gun into a federal offense, it took opposition
by FBI Director Louis Freeh and Chief Justice William Rehnquist to
block the measure (Richman 1999, p. 767; Gest 2001, pp. 69-70).
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The efforts by the Bush (I) and Clinton administrations to deploy
federal agents and prosecutors against violent crime (and drug trafficking)-either on their own or in various joint task forces-did not come
at the expense of federal grants to state and local governments in this
area. Indeed, both in their dollar amounts and in the discretion they
gave to state and local enforcers, federal grant programs took off during the 1990s. The LEAA may have been disbanded in 1980, but the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 reestablished a federal
grant program for state anticrime efforts, to be run out of the Office
of Justice Programs (Beckett 1997, pp. 94-95). And while federal funding for local crime control in 1986 was only one-fourth of what it had
been eight years earlier, it soon took off, quadrupling between 1986
and 1995 in nominal dollars (doubling in real terms) (Congressional
Budget Office 1996, p. 36). The Crime Control Act of 1990 (Pub. L.
101-647) authorized $900 million for the Edward Byrne Memorial
State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance programs, which funded
violence reduction and narcotics enforcement and were administered
by the states (Laney 1998; Russell-Einhorn, Ward, and Seeherman
2000, p. 36). Appropriations for these programs ranged from $535 million in fiscal 1996 to $569 million in fiscal 2001 (O'Bryant 2004, p. 3).
With the election of Bill Clinton, and in the wake of his campaign
promise to put 100,000 new police officers on the streets, came the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Pub. L.
103-322), which "authorized the spending of a staggering $30 billion
to help State and local enforcement agencies fight crime over the 6year life of the bill's coverage" (Roth et al. 2000, p. 41). The big development here was a readiness-in the form of the COPS (Community Oriented Police Services) programs-to put money directly into
the hands of local police departments. Actual appropriations to the
COPS program were $1.4 billion for each year between 1996 and 1999.
They fell to $595 million in 2000 but were back up to over $1 billion
in 2001 (O'Bryant 2004, p. 4).
Big cities' police departments did particularly well under the COPS
program. Of all the agencies awarded grants under the COPS program
by the end of 1997, "only 4% served core city jurisdictions." But they
received 40 percent of COPS dollar awards for all programs combined
and 62 percent of all COPS MORE (Making Officer Redeployment
Effective) funds (which went to technology, civilians, and overtime)
(Roth et al. 2000, p. 10). By 1997, local crime prevention took a bigger
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slice of the Justice Department's budget than the FBI, DEA, or Immigration and Naturalization Service. In fact, among all Justice components, only the Bureau of Prisons got more than the units that funneled money to state and local enforcers (Sherman et al. 1997, pp.
1-11).
D. The Allure of Violent Crime Federalism
The degree to which these federal programs achieved their stated
goal of crime reduction is still under study. Figuring out whether or
to what extent any policing program or approach has affected crime
rates will always be hard (Sherman 1992; Levitt 1997; Blumstein and
Wallman 2000), and the limited nature of federal operational interventions makes their assessment particularly difficult. One recent study
suggests that Project Exile, whose success in reducing the Richmond
homicide rate was celebrated by the Clinton and later the Bush (II)
administrations, actually had little or no effect on it (Raphael and Ludwig 2003). An examination of Boston's Operation Ceasefire, however,
found that it was "likely responsible for a significant reduction in the
city's rates of youth homicide and gun violence" (Kennedy et al. 2001,
p. 64).
As for the role of federal funding, this is difficult too, in part because
it implicates the long-debated question of whether increasing the size
of the police decreases crime, and more particularly whether increases
in police size played a role in the crime drop in the 1990s. In 2000,
John R. Eck and Edward R. McGuire (2000, p. 209) found "little evidence that changes in the number of police officers are responsible for
recent changes (in either direction) in violent crime." Yet others such
as Steven Levitt (using nationwide data) and Corman and Mocan (focusing on New York City) maintain that they have found just such
evidence (Levitt 1997, 2002; Corman and Mocan 2000; McCrary
2002). In 2004, Levitt broadly asserted that the increase in police between 1991 and 2001 "can explain somewhere between one-fifth and
one-tenth of the overall decline in crime" during that period (2004, p.
186).
Even were one to conclude that increases in police forces in the
1990s helped cause the decrease in crime, the question of how much
credit for this belongs to federal aid would remain. Certainly the increase in police was coincident with and to some extent was funded by
the COPS program. One economist would give President Clinton and
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the COPS program "credit for engineering more crime reduction
through federal policy action than any President since Franklin Roosevelt ushered in the repeal of Prohibition" (Donohue 2004, p. 3). But
precisely how much credit should have been given to that program is
open to debate (Office of the Inspector General 1999; Roth et al. 2000;
Zhao, Scheider, and Thurman 2002; Ekstrand and Kingsbury 2003;
Zhao and Thurman 2003; U.S. Government Accountability Office
2005). One needs to figure out how much money localities would independently have spent on a serious crime problem, and how much
money actually stuck to the departments it was given to (as opposed
to supplanting local funding that ended up being spent outside the
criminal justice system [Evans and Owens 2005]). Even in 2005, as the
COPS program winds down, the battle about its effectiveness rages
(Eisler and Johnson 2005).
From the intergovernmental perspective, however, the important
point is that the latter part of the 1990s marked the high-water mark
of a federal-state-local relationship based on violent crime enforcement
that (surprise, surprise) nicely served the interests of almost all of the
governmental actors involved. Presidential administrations of both parties got to tout their commitment to the Fight against Crime and the
War on Drugs. Legislators, who readily appropriated large sums of
money for these endeavors, could tout their commitment as well, but
there was more to it than that. For the essence of the violent crime
targeted by the enforcement and funding programs was local. While
there was much talk, and perhaps some reality, of coordination, innovation, and "best practices," the thrust of these programs was to dispatch federal dollars and manpower to their constituencies. And with
each conspicuous deployment-be it funding grant or enforcement
program-a legislator's press release could take some credit. Congressional representatives could also take credit for relieving local enforcers
of burdensome grant compliance (Chubb 1985).
The in-kind aid to localities entailed by federal investigations and
prosecutions offered certain advantages to the feds over the direct
funding alternative: First, in contrast to funding, which all too often
had become lost in state bureaucracies or had been diverted to unintended local needs, federal prosecutors and agents could ensure that
enforcement assistance reached its intended destination. The long tradition of prosecutorial discretion and the relative opacity of enforcement decision making also allowed federal authorities greater freedom
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to steer resources to areas of need-far less fettered by the norm of
horizontal equity that bedeviled congressional appropriations (Zimring
and Hawkins 1992, p. 166). Moreover, lacking any easy ability to predict and measure the extent of this sort of federal aid, state and local
policy makers would presumably be less "inclined to offset increased
federal aid through decreases in their expenditures" (O'Hear 2004, p.
850).
The interests of federal enforcement agencies were also well served
by the new violent crime priorities (which overlapped with the narcotics enforcement priority). The general public was happy to see the
"feds" deployed against local bad guys-street gangs, armed robbers,
and murderers. And the championship of these cases by local legislative
delegations could only redound to the benefit of agencies at funding
time and to field offices in their relations with headquarters. The timing for the FBI was particularly propitious, as the end of the Cold War
appeared to allow the redeployment of agents from counterintelligence
to antiviolence assignments (Johnston 1992). And ATF had its own
incentives: By making a specialty of violent crime, the agency whose
unpopular gun control mission had almost led to its elimination gained
a mission that even the National Rifle Association could not quarrel
with and gained valuable allies in the local law enforcement community
(Vizzard 1997; Richman 2001, p. 399). Agents and prosecutors also
enjoyed the extent of their discretion in this area. There may have
been political pressure to do violent crime cases. But there was little
pressure to any particular case. Violent crime was still, after all, primarily a local responsibility. Federal enforcers thus could be quite strategic in their case selection decisions and in the neighborhoods they
targeted (Glazer 1999).
The only federal branch that did not support federal intrusion into
the street crime area was the judiciary (or at least a significant component thereof). Many judges believed that the burgeoning criminal
docket impaired the "quality of justice" in criminal cases and also impaired their "ability to perform their core constitutional function in
civil cases" (Miner 1992, p. 681; Wilkenson 1994; Beale 1995, p. 983).
These particular criminal cases also demanded an unusual expenditure
of judicial resources, in part because the high mandatory minimums
led many defendants to go to trial. A study by the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts noted not just a huge increase in federal firearms
cases between 1989 and 1998, but also the costs of that increase: "In
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comparison to 1989, a firearms case filed in 1998 was more likely to
involve multiple defendants, more likely to take longer between filing
and disposition of the case, more likely than other types of crimes to
result in a jury trial, and more likely to result in a longer prison sentence for the defendant(s)" (Walker and Patrick 2000, p. 6). Some
judges also complained about efforts to turn "garden-variety state law
drug offenses into federal offenses" (United States v. Aguilar, 779 F.2d
123, 125 [2d Cir. 1985]) or violent crime prosecutions that turned their
dignified setting "into a minor-grade police court" (Campbell 1999, p.
1).
Perhaps because the judiciary bridled at the costs the political
branches imposed on it, and certainly because of changes in the Supreme Court's composition that increased the number of justices committed to limiting federal power, the nonchalance with which the Court
viewed extensions of federal criminal jurisdiction came to a halt in 1995
(Althouse 2001). In United States v. Lopez (514 U.S. 549 [1995]), the
Court, by a narrow majority, held that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause powers when it enacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990, which made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly
to possess a firearm" in a school zone. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, stressed the need to judicially enforce the "distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local" (Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 [1995]; Moulton 1999). Outside the courtroom, Rehnquist and
other luminaries of the bar made the point as well, in testimony to
Congress, speeches, and reports (Committee on Long Range Planning
1995; Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law 1998; Baker
1999, p. 675; Richman 2003, p. 795 n. 216). In his "1998 Year-End
Report of the Federal Judiciary," Rehnquist warned:
The trend to federalize crimes that traditionally have been handled
in state courts not only is taxing the Judiciary's resources and affecting its budget needs, but it also threatens to change entirely
the nature of our federal system. The pressure in Congress to appear responsive to every highly publicized societal ill or sensational
crime needs to be balanced with an inquiry into whether states are
doing an adequate job in these particular areas and, ultimately,
whether we want most of our legal relationships decided at the national rather than local level. Federal courts were not created to
adjudicate local crimes, no matter how sensational or heinous the
crimes may be. State courts do, can, and should handle such problems. While there certainly are areas in criminal law in which the
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federal government must act, the vast majority of localized criminal cases should be decided in the state courts which are equipped
for such matters. This principle was enunciated by Abraham Lincoln in the 19th century, and Dwight Eisenhower in the 20th century-matters that can be handled adequately by the states should
be left to them; matters that cannot be so handled should be undertaken by the federal government. (Rehnquist 1999)
The very intensity of this lobbying effort, however, highlighted the
Supreme Court's impotence against the political branches. So did the
Court's own case law, which continued to give only light review to
statutes that (unlike the one in Lopez) made interstate commerce an
element of the crime. Once the school gun statute was revised to require a jury to find that a defendant's gun had at some point moved
in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. sec. 9 2 2 (q)), its constitutionality
became unassailable under well-settled precedents, for example, United
States v. Danks, 221 E3d 1037, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1999) (Richman 2000,
p. 90; Denning and Reynolds 2003).
For their part, the local officials-particularly police officials-whose
sovereign interests the Supreme Court purported to defend against
federal encroachment were generally pretty comfortable with federal
initiatives (Geller and Morris 1992, pp. 312-13). They liked the direct
grants, overtime pay, and the aid-in-kind that federal enforcement activity-and the significant procedural and sentencing advantages flowing therefrom-really amounted to (Geller and Morris 1992, pp.
257-62; Jeffries and Gleeson 1995, pp. 1103-25; GAO 1996; RussellEinhorn, Ward, and Seeherman 2000, pp. 14-15; Richman 2003, p.
768). In part because of favorable procedural and evidentiary rules, and
in part because they had the luxury of lighter dockets, the likelihood
of a defendant's conviction was greater in federal court than in state.
And because of the federal sentencing scheme-with its high mandatory minimum sentences for certain firearm and narcotics offenses and
sentencing guidelines keyed to the facts of the charged conduct
(broadly defined) that substantially constrained sentencing judges' ability to consider certain mitigating factors-federal defendants ended up
getting more time in prison than they would have in the state system
(Clymer 1997; O'Hear 2002; Miller and Eisenstein 2005, p. 248). Not
only was each federal street crime defendant someone who otherwise
would have been prosecuted in state court, but local enforcers who
coordinated their activities with the feds benefited simply from work-
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ing in the federal shadow: The large difference between federal and
state sentences meant that defendants would quickly plead out in state
court to avoid (maybe) having their case taken federally (O'Hear 2004,
p. 813).
Turf battles between local and federal enforcers happened from time
to time. And local officials often perceived cooperation with federal
agencies as "a one-way street" (Russell-Einhorn, Ward, and Seeherman
2000, p. 18). But when it came to violent crime, local police officials
were generally in the cat-bird's seat. FBI, ATF, DEA, and other federal
agents could not patrol the streets. They rarely infiltrated gangs. Calls
to 911 were not routed to them. And citizens generally took their
complaints to the police. If a federal agency wanted to work the violent
crime area, it would have to do it with the acquiescence and probably
the full cooperation of the police. And the police knew that. They also
gained some bargaining leverage over local prosecutors, on whom they
used to be wholly dependant. Explaining how his department determined whether to take a case to federal or state prosecutors, a Richmond, Virginia, police captain noted, in 1998, that "it's like buying a
car: we're going to the place we feel we can get the best deal. We shop
around" (Bonner 1998, p. 930). Local agencies also were given institutional mechanisms for coordinating and collaborating with federal
agencies through the creation of various joint task forces (RussellEinhorn, Ward, and Seeherman 2000).
From time to time, one would hear local district attorneys complaining about federal incursion. In 1997, the president of the National
District Attorneys Association made clear that his organization had
"long opposed the unwarranted federalization of crime in the belief
that it works to the detriment of the efficient and effective use of our
law enforcement and legal resources" (Baker 1999, p. 677 n. 26). And
local prosecutors sometimes complained that federal prosecutors
"cherry-picked" the best cases (Miller and Eisenstein 2005, p. 259).
But even those complaints were rare, since there certainly was enough
street violence to go around, and, as one district attorney put it, the
increased federal commitment gave local prosecutors "more flexibility"
(Richman 2001, p. 405). Indeed, a Justice Department-sponsored study
of federal-local collaboration in San Diego, Memphis, and Detroit reported in 2000 that if local prosecutors were bothered by anything, it
was more likely to be by the alacrity with which the feds declined cases
rather than the greed with which they grabbed them (Russell-Einhorn,
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Ward, and Seeherman 2000, p. 116). Moreover, the locals benefited
even in the cases they kept. As Miller and Eisenstein found in their
study of relations between federal and local authorities in an unnamed
large city, local prosecutors could "leverage their cooperative relations
with the [U.S. Attorney's office] to pressure defendants to plead guilty
to higher than average sentences in state court," and they could also
send a message to local judges and legislatures about the insufficiency
of local sentences (Miller and Eisenstein 2005, p. 262). In addition,
local prosecutors also were placated through the system of "crossdesignation," in which U.S. Attorneys' offices cross-deputized local assistant DAs as federal prosecutors, allowing the ADAs to follow a case
that might have originated locally into a federal court (Miller and Eisenstein 2005, p. 261).
Just because federal authorities depended on the local police to
jump-start their violent crime investigations did not mean that information flowed freely between agencies. Indeed, police officers frequently complained that federal agencies-the FBI in particular-were
not very good about sharing (Russell-Einhorn, Ward, and Seeherman
2000, p. 120). The advantages flowing from federal activity in the area,
however, outweighed this concern, and there was in fact improvement
over time, spurred by formal mechanisms such as joint task forces and
informal ones such as personal familiarity (Geller and Morris 1992, pp.
266, 272).
At the state level, officials occasionally went on record expressing
concern that "some attempts to expand federal criminal law into traditional state functions . . . could undermine state and local anticrime
efforts" (Baker 1999, p. 676; see also Richman 2001, p. 249). Their
annoyance is particularly understandable when one thinks about the
effects that federal activity had on the balance of power between state
and local governments. On the funding side, states saw an increased
readiness by the federal government to funnel money directly to localities, in contrast to the LEAA model, in which some money and
power stuck to state hands on the way. The COPS program was only
the most dramatic example of this policy shift. On the enforcement
side, state officials saw their local counterparts working directly with
field offices and U.S. Attorneys' offices, not just in big cities but in
smaller ones as well, rendering state policy making even less relevant
than before (Richman 1999, pp. 786-87; O'Hear 2004, p. 852). Overall
though, state officials' resistance was muted, perhaps because of their
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appreciation of the relief that federal activity offered to the state criminal justice budget.
This decade of direct grants, block grants, and enforcement assistance from the federal government to state and local authorities did
not come to an end with the election of George W Bush in 2000.
With great fanfare, the new president announced an Initiative to Reduce Gun Violence and, as he had in his campaign, embraced a program of maximal federal involvement in gun violence prosecutions
(Bush and Ashcroft 2001). In a May 2001 memo to department heads,
Attorney General John Ashcroft included, as two of his seven goals,
"reducing drug violence and drug trafficking" and "helping states with
anti-crime programs." He did not even mention terrorism (Seper 2001;
Clymer 2002). The new administration did announce plans to phase
out the COPS program-not that surprising, given that Republicans
had long questioned the efficacy of this Clinton program that tended
to funnel most of its money to big-city Democratic strongholds. But
the plan envisioned a reconfiguring of federal aid in the violent crime
area, not a transfer away from it (Oliphant 2001).
Then came the attacks on September 11, 2001.

II. The Post-9/11 Dynamic
We are often told that September 11 "changed everything." Although
an obvious overstatement in some contexts, it is quite apt when applied
to the federal, state, and local law enforcement dynamic. The new
pressures on the system were felt immediately: As the feds made the
prevention of future attacks their highest priority, they placed new demands on the police for information and for cooperation in immigration enforcement-quite a shift from the days in which the feds' primary role vis- -vis the police was as provider of enforcement assistance.
Many local authorities saw the role that the feds expected them to play
in the counterterrorism effort as inconsistent, or at least in tension,
with their local crime-fighting responsibilities. They also saw the federal funding for their local crime fighting diverted to the War on Terror. The intergovernmental tensions stemming from these new pressures continue as this essay is written (in July 2005).
Even as the daily newspapers tell of new flare-ups between state,
local, and federal authorities, however, they also show signs of a new
modus vivendi emerging-one in which violent crime and terrorism
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coexist as the focal points of a new domestic intelligence network that
is actually the country's first national police system. The cohesiveness
and architecture of this network cannot yet be determined. But its
emergence as part of the longer-term effects of 9/11 will also be explored here.
A. Immediate Effects of the 9/11 Attacks
The shock that the September 11 attacks gave to the federal enforcement bureaucracy was extraordinary. Before this, there were a few
specialized "beats" that the feds had to patrol nationwide-espionage,
immigration, federal tax offenses, counterfeiting, maybe organized
crime. But the system's defining luxury was the absence of any responsibility to pursue any particular case in most of the areas in which
it had jurisdiction (Richman 1999, p. 766). Now, it was suddenly saddled with a politically unavoidable, and all-but-impossible, responsibility: preventing another such attack.
To their credit, federal enforcement officials made a concerted effort
to reach out to state and local agencies for intelligence-gathering assistance and diplomatically sought to address long-standing local complaints about the feds' reluctance to share information. FBI Director
Mueller made conciliatory speeches and created a new Office of Law
Enforcement Coordination, headed by a former police chief, within
the FBI (Eggen 2004). Attorney General Ashcroft created new institutional mechanisms for coordinating counterterrorism activities across
all levels of government. Prior to September 11, there had been only
thirty-five Joint Terrorist Task Forces-operational groups of federal,
state, and local agents (912 in all) who conducted field investigations
into terrorist activity. After September 11, there would be fifty-six, one
for every FBI field office, and, by 2005, 103, with a total of 5,085
members. Ashcroft also created Anti-terrorism Task Forces (later renamed Anti-terrorism Advisory Councils) in every federal district.
Their job was to serve as the conduit of information about suspected
terrorists between federal and local agencies and to coordinate the district's response to a terrorist attack (U.S. Department of Justice 2002;
U.S. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General 2005).
And the department worked hard to speed up security clearances for
state and local officials (GAO 2004c).
These moves all testified to the new intergovernmental intelligence
dynamic. Given the nature of the perceived terrorist threat-the
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sleeper cells waiting to strike again-federal agencies now relied on the
intelligence capabilities of local police forces in a way they never did
when the primary area of interaction was violent crime. Back then, the
feds needed help from the locals; but since they could walk away from
any case and could offer many benefits, they had considerable leverage.
Now the rush was on to create the semblance of a national intelligence
network providing what Philip Heymann has called "untargeted prevention" (1998, p. 82). In this, the participation of local cops was absolutely essential.
What state and local enforcers bring to the counterterrorism intelligence-gathering process is not simply a function of their numbers708,022 sworn state and local police officers in 2000 (the last count)
compared to 93,446 federal law enforcement officers (more than a
quarter of whom were in the Federal Bureau of Prisons) in 2002
(Reeves and Bauer 2002, p. 8; Reeves and Hickman 2002, p. 1)-nor
even of the many things they learn while on street patrol. It also stems
from their involvement in bringing the bulk of serious criminal charges
in the United States, because the threat of prosecution (even prosecutions having nothing to do with terrorism) is one of the best tools
around for prying loose closely held information. Moreover, their order maintenance and public safety duties give local police a more balanced "portfolio" in dealing with community leaders. The police officer who seeks information from a local Arab-American community
leader has probably met and assisted that leader before (Murphy and
Plotkin 2003, p. 43; Thacher 2005, pp. 648-49).
The Justice Department quickly went beyond vague talk of "information sharing" and asked for local assistance in a large-scale program
to interview thousands of people (mostly young Middle Eastern males)
in the country on nonimmigrant visas (GAO 2003b). In the spring of
2002, the department went further and announced its plan to place
names of certain aliens who had violated their visa requirements into
the national database of wanted suspects. It asked state and local police
to arrest these "absconders" and (reversing a position it had taken since
1996) noted that, as a legal matter, such assistance was "within the
inherent authority of the states" (Ashcroft 2002; Thompson 2002; National Council of La Raza v. Department ofJustice, 411 E3d 350 [2d Cir.
2005]).
Police departments rushed to help, and the constant drumbeat from
them during 2002 and into 2003 was that the feds were not sharing
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information with the locals, were not putting them "in the game"
(Murphy and Plotkin 2003, p. 9). That said, conditions were not altogether propitious for police cooperation. In a number of cities and
states, officials took stands (pretty symbolic, to be sure) against the
administration's counterterrorism efforts. ByJuly 20, 2005, seven states
and 386 local governments had passed resolutions condemning (at least
in part) the USA Patriot Act (United and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) (115 Star. 272)-the antiterrorism legislation
passed soon after the September 11 attacks-and opposing the involvement of local agencies in federal intelligence initiatives not sanctioned
by local law (Bill of Rights Defense Committee 2005) (listing all such
resolutions).
Some of this scattered resistance may have arisen from partisan politics or liberal orientation. But there was a historical basis as well, for
the federal efforts to recruit local police into a national intelligence
network brought back memories of 1968, when, at the behest of the
feds, local departments had created intelligence units whose zeal to
gather and disseminate information on potential "civil disorders" had
led to abuses (Church Committee 1976, pp. 332-33).
Local concerns were not merely partisan, philosophical, or historical.
They also grew out of local politics. When the federal-local interaction
was centered on violent crime, federal initiatives brought significant
positive externalities-credit for local leaders and maybe even improved local safety. To be sure, the feds also claimed credit. But the
benefits stayed in the area, and the feds picked up a decent share of
the costs. The counterterrorism dynamic has been precisely the reverse, save in some exceptional locations, such as New York Citywhich, somewhat to the dismay of the FBI, has gone so far as to develop its own overseas intelligence network (Miller 2005; National
Academy of Public Administration 2005, p. 39; U.S. Department of
Justice. Office of the Inspector General 2005, p. 49). As a general matter, there is no reason to expect that terrorists pose a particular threat
to the many places in which they or information about them will be
found (Thacher 2005, pp. 637-38). In those areas, the gains from domestic intelligence gathering thus are felt primarily, even exclusively,
at the national level. But the costs of gathering fall on the localitiesnot just the fiscal costs, but the significant negative externalities that
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attend any large-scale investigations of immigrant activities in communities that have large numbers of immigrants.
Police departments, of course, do not always share the concerns of
their political masters. But police officials have had their own pragmatic concerns about federal counterterrorism initiatives, particularly
those involving the use of federal immigration statutes. As the International Association of Chiefs of Police has explained:
Immigration enforcement by state and local police could have a
chilling effect in immigrant communities and could limit cooperation with police by members of those communities. Local police
agencies depend on the cooperation of immigrants, legal and illegal, in solving all sorts of crimes and in the maintenance of public
order. Without assurances that they will not be subject to an immigration investigation and possible deportation, many immigrants
with critical information would not come forward, even when heinous crimes are committed against them or their families. Because
many families with undocumented family members also include legal immigrant members, this would drive a potential wedge between police and huge portions of the legal immigrant community
as well. (IACP 2004b, p. 5; see Badie 2002; Thompson 2002; U.S.
House. Judiciary Committee 2003)
(It is worth noting that the FBI may share these concerns. A 2005
report by the National Academy of Public Administration noted that
"the FBI is concerned that overly zealous immigration and customs
enforcement will undercut its collection operations, which are driven
increasingly by prevention, not enforcement" [2005, p. 37]).
The nonfederal officials most disposed to assist in enforcing the immigration laws have come from the state level, not the local. In Maryland, a newspaper reported that "many local police departments ...
including those in Baltimore and in Anne Arundel and Baltimore counties, generally will not report illegal immigrants unless they have committed crimes." But "state police policy is to inform federal authorities
about any suspected of being in the country illegally" (Song 2003, p.
1B). As of June 2005, only Florida and Alabama had formally signed
on to the federal initiative, and in Alabama it appears that only state
troopers are involved (Orange County, California, may soon sign on
too) (U.S. House Judiciary Committee 2003; Swarns 2004; Crummy
2005).
Why the difference between the attitudes of local police departments
and their statewide counterparts? Straightforward political differences
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may play a part here-Republican governors versus more liberal urban
local officials. But institutional obligations (or the lack thereof) likely
play a role as well. For it is at the local level, and particularly in big
cities, that the costs imposed by the federal enforcement initiative on
relationships with immigrant communities would hit hardest (Thacher
2005).
Even had nothing else changed in the relationship between federal
and local enforcers, the new federal counterterrorism initiatives would
have imposed new intelligence-gathering responsibilities on the police
and arguably have made it harder to maintain order in areas with significant immigrant populations, including most big cities. But the costs
effectively imposed on the police by the federal counterterrorism focus
went beyond that, because that focus threatened to come at the expense
of federal enforcement activity in the violent crime area. Certainly this
was true with respect to the FBI. A September 2004 audit report by
the Justice Department's Inspector General's office found that the
number of nonsupervisory field agents allocated to "violent crimes and
major offenders" had dropped from 2,004 in fiscal 2000 to 1,006 in
fiscal 2002 (U.S. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General 2004, p. 17). The bureau significantly reduced its narcotics activity
as well. Moreover, a March 2004 GAO report noted that "use of field
agent staff resources in . . . traditional criminal investigative programs
(such as drug enforcement, violent crime, and white collar crime) has
continuously dropped below allocated levels as agents from these programs have been temporarily reassigned to work on counterterrorismrelated matters" (2004b, p. 25). In consequence, the number of FBI
violent crime matters opened went from 9,034 in the second quarter
of fiscal 2001 to 4,810 in the last quarter of fiscal 2003 (p. 32). Because
ATF increased its violent crime activity during this period, the overall
number of violent crime referrals in the federal system actually increased by 29 percent between fiscal 2001 and fiscal 2003 (GAO 2004a,
p. 18). But it is not yet clear whether the DEA will take up the FBI's
burden in the narcotics area. As an August 2004 GAO report found,
there is not conclusive evidence as to whether shifts in the FBI's priorities have had an effect on overall federal efforts to combat violent
and drug crime (pp. 3-4). Nonetheless, local officials might well see
the bureau's assertion of the primacy of terrorism prevention as a harbinger of future shifts by all federal agencies away from the areas in
which federal activity had eased their load.

The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism

Note that the point here is not that the shift in federal resources
was a mistake. Indeed, one of the greatest benefits flowing from the
federal enforcement bureaucracy's relative lack of political accountability is its flexibility in responding to changing circumstances. However, the duration and apparent stability of federal agencies' commitment to street crime enforcement during the 1980s and 1990s set a
new baseline for local expectations of federal enforcement assistance.
And, since September 11, these expectations were at obvious risk of
being dashed.
Fiscal expectations were certainly being dashed. During a period in
which the economic downturn and the political popularity of tax cuts
placed new budget pressure on state and local governments (Multistate
Tax Commission 2003; Mattoon 2004), local and state governments
also found themselves facing massive homeland security expenditures.
In January 2002, the U.S. Conference of Mayors estimated the costs
of heightened security for cities in the coming year would be $2.1
billion (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2002a). State governments expected their costs would be up to $4 billion (Hobijn 2002, p. 24). Yet
particularly in the most populous states, the federal reimbursement
formula established by Congress, and reinforced by the new Department of Homeland Security, left these governments bearing a considerable percentage of these costs (U.S. House Select Committee on
Homeland Security 2004).
Recapitulating the old debates about how federal crime money was
to be distributed, local authorities also complained about the decision
to distribute homeland security funds through the states rather than to
them directly. One police chief complained in a spring 2003 congressional hearing that homeland security "resources do not go directly to
local police departments. They cannot be used to hire new police.
They cannot be used to pay overtime expenses that we incur each and
every time Secretary Ridge changes the alert level. They can be used
to purchase equipment, but not by me. I have to wait for a statewide
plan to be developed and then I have to hope that a fair share of those
funds will filter to my department" (U.S. Senate. Governmental Affairs
Committee 2003a, p. 48 [testimony of Jeffrey Horvath, Police Chief,
Dover, Delaware]; see also U.S. Conference of Mayors 2002b).
The response of state governments to the calls of local units for
direct federal funding also echoed the state responses in the days of
the LEAA. Speaking for the National Governors Association at a
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spring 2003 congressional hearing, Massachusetts Governor Mitt
Romney testified that "we believe it critical that homeland security
funding and resources be applied against comprehensive and integrated
statewide plans." "Without statewide coordination, there is no check
on gaps in coverage, incompatible equipment and communications systems, and wasteful duplication" (U.S. Senate. Governmental Affairs
Committee 2003b, p. 50). As before, there may have been a degree of
self-interest behind these state arguments. But they had considerably
more power in the homeland security context, given the geographic
scale of the catastrophic attacks that were envisioned (Wise and Nader
2002, p. 49; Kettl 2003).
Because they see cities as bearing the brunt (in both fiscal and political costs) of any nationwide intelligence-gathering and security patrolling effort, local officials, particularly from bigger cities, would
likely have complained about the very nature of the Bush administration's embrace of the statewide funding model for homeland security.
Their sense of grievance has been intensified, however, by their perception that it is "their" violent crime money that is now going to the
states.
The fungibility of money makes the link impossible to prove. And,
in the Bush administration's defense, it should be noted that the COPS
program has long been a Republican target. Yet urban officials have
made much of the coincidence that the COPS program is being phased
out, and other crime control grants reduced, just as homeland security
funding plans are being made. And they have noted the significant
reductions in grants under the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant
programs, which went from a total of around $400 million in 2001 to
$115 million in 2004 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004, p. 1). These
are the grants that go directly to local government units, and local
officials took it hard. One police chief testified that "there is a concern
in the law enforcement community, that new assistance programs are
being funded at the expense of traditional law enforcement assistance
programs such as the COPS program, the Local Law Enforcement
Block Grant Program and the Byrne Grant program" (U.S. Senate.
Governmental Affairs Committee 2003a [testimony ofJeffrey Horvath,
Police Chief, Dover, Delaware]). As a report by the U.S. Conference
of Mayors noted in 2002, "The Administration is proposing to cut
funding for existing law enforcement programs such as the COPS program (80 percent cut) and the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant
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(merged and cut 20 percent). If approved by Congress, these cuts
would result in a major reduction in the ability of mayors and the
police to prevent and respond to both traditional street crime and the
new threat of domestic terrorism" (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2002b,
p. 4).
The fiscal picture remains in flux, as of July 2005 (right after the
attacks in London). In November 2004, Congress passed an appropriations bill for fiscal 2005 that cut the three main law enforcement
assistance programs by 24.4 percent. And the IACP (2004a, p. 1) reported that "the funding levels for these programs have declined by
almost $1.24 billion" since 2002, representing "a cut of 50%." In February 2005, the administration's budget request for 2006 proposed further reductions in the COPS program and the elimination of the Justice Assistance Grant Program-the program created in 2005 to
replace the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program and the
Byrne Memorial Grant Program (Reese 2005). The IACP (2005, p. 1)
reported that "overall, funding levels for assistance programs that are
primarily designed to assist state and local law enforcement agencies
were slashed by $1.467 billion when compared to FY 2005." Wrangling
continues also over the distribution and designation over homeland
security funding as well, with Congress considering cuts in state and
local grants, and with representatives from smaller states still preferring
pro rata rather than needs-based distribution of federal funds
(Gaouette 2005; Mintz 2005).
B. Longer Term Effects
It is hard (although not impossible) to imagine that the federal government's new counterterrorist focus will completely displace its
decades-old commitment to assisting state and local governments in
controlling violent crime. An insightful report completed in 2000 (before the September 11 attacks) for the National Institute of Justice
predicted that, although the level of federal activity in the violent crime
area would remain high, the reasons for that level might change:
Rather than reflecting the original, predominantly Washington-directed impetus for Federal involvement in urban crime, expanded
collaborative activities in the coming decade may demonstrate the
influence and support of local politicians and law enforcement authorities who-at least in many areas of the country-have grown
accustomed to relying on Federal collaboration as a way of dem-
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onstrating heightened commitment to the fight against crime and
supplementing what are often scarce local resources in that fight.
(Russell-Einhorn, Ward, and Seeherman 2000, p. 125)
These local political influences may lie behind the readiness of the
federal government even after September 11 to make conspicuous
commitments of resources to the War on Crime. Notwithstanding the
continuation of the fall in the national violent crime rate -down 3
percent between 2002 and 2003, down 1.7 percent between 2003 and
2004 (FBI 2004c)-and the shift of FBI agents from violent crime to
counterterrorism, the Bush administration still announced the Violent
Crime Reduction Initiative in June 2004 (Silver 2004; U.S. Department
of Justice 2004) and in December 2004 trumpeted the commitment of
FBI agents to the fight against violent gangs (Ragavan and Guttman
2004). In April 2005, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced
the arrest of more than 10,000 fugitives as part of Operation FALCON
(Federal and Local Cops Organized Nationally). He explained that
"Operation FALCON is an excellent example of President Bush's direction and the Justice Department's dedication to deal both with the
terrorist threat and traditional violent crime" (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).
Nonetheless, the current trajectory of the federal enforcement bureaucracy is toward a reduction in its commitment to fighting violent
crime. In December 2003, Massachusetts Public Safety Secretary Edward Flynn called terrorism "the monster that ate criminal justice"
(Law Enforcement News 2003). Perhaps this is a bit of an overstatement.
But it is certainly clear that for the foreseeable future, violent crime
will not define the relationship between the federal government and
state and local governments with respect to criminal justice. Violent
crime remains an indefeasible local obligation. Yet instead of being the
focus of coordination between the feds and locals, it now threatens to
put them at odds.
It is possible that the developing clash of interests between federal
and local enforcers will create a zero-sum game in which any improvements in the emerging domestic intelligence network will come at the
expense of local efforts against violent crime. Although overriding national security concerns might be offered to justify the wholesale enlistment of local police forces into a federally directed counterterrorist
bureaucracy, the constitutional prohibition against federal "commandeering" would likely prevent the feds from simply ordering the police
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to cooperate (Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 [1997]; New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 [1992]; Caminker 1995; Hills 1998, 1999).
This prohibition, based in part on the Tenth Amendment and more
generally on respect for state sovereignty, could be read to preclude
Congress from directing state government officials (including law enforcement officers) to implement federal policy. Still, some combination of political pressure and federal conditional funding-which remains largely unregulated by the Supreme Court (Baker 1995)-could
push the police in that direction, requiring them to draw down on the
community relations capital that they have spent the last decade or
more building up.
One could also imagine a scenario in which the police pulled back
from cooperating with the federal authorities and the feds tried to
develop their own domestic intelligence network that avoided relying
too heavily on nonfederal personnel. Any such effort would be hamstrung by the comparative distance of federal agencies from the lives
of people in densely populated urban communities. To be sure, federal
authorities seem committed to reaching out on their own, and the FBI
has worked hard to forge relationships with the Muslim and ArabAmerican communities (Sullivan 2003; FBI 2004b). But one has only
to think about the TIPS (Terrorist Information and Prevention System) debacle to recognize how fraught broad-based federal information-gathering initiatives can be. First mentioned by President Bush in
his 2002 State of the Union address, the TIPS program was pitched
by the Justice Department as a way to enlist the observatory powers
of service providers around the nation in the War on Terror. The idea
was to create a "national system for reporting suspicious and potentially
terrorist-related activity" involving "millions of American workers who,
in the daily course of their work, are in a unique position to see potentially unusual or suspicious activity in public places" (Eggen 2002a).
But reaction from both ends of the political spectrum at this "latest
manifestation of Big Brother" was immediate and hostile (Shapiro
2003). Before long, under pressure from Congress and others, the program was reconfigured to "involve only truck workers, dock workers,
bus drivers and others who are in positions to monitor places and
events that are obviously public" (Eggen 2002b, p. 1A). Even this tactical retreat was not enough, and the initiative was soon legislated out
of existence (Eggen 2002a).
Those who prefer looking further back can recall the American Pro-
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tective League, with which the Bureau of Investigation (the FBI's predecessor agency) developed an auxiliary relationship during World War
I. By June 1917, the league had around 250,000 members, looking for
suspicious activity around the nation and inquiring into the loyalty of
government and Red Cross personnel (Cummings and McFarland
1937, p. 421). The league's "free-wheeling" operations against alleged
"slackers," "spies," and "saboteurs" remain an embarrassment to any
who believes in civil liberties, competent domestic security programs,
or some combination thereof (Powers 2004, pp. 87-100).
Or moving forward a bit in time, one can look at COINTELPRO
(from "counterintelligence program") and other programs in the 1960s,
in which the FBI, as well as other intelligence agencies, sometimes with
the help of local police intelligence units, launched a broad campaign
to determine whether communist infiltration or some other subversive
campaign lay behind the urban riots, antiwar protests, the civil rights
movement, and other dissenters of all stripes (Cunningham 2003). The
agencies quickly moved beyond conventional investigative tactics and
resorted to illegal break-ins, warrantless wiretaps, and campaigns to
discredit their targets (Keller 1989, pp. 154-89; O'Reilly 1998; Theoharis 1999, pp. 32-35; Kreimer 2004).
The fact is that domestic intelligence operations historically (and
perhaps inherently) pose peculiar risks to democratic society. Domestic
intelligence operations have even fewer outcome measures than federal
law enforcement, have extremely low visibility because of security sensitivities, and often involve political or potentially political judgments
about targeting and methods. The more committed an agency is to
these operations, the greater its need for political cover from the White
House, which has too often been tempted to extract intelligence targeting power in return and to use that power for inappropriate political
ends.
These pessimistic scenarios are not the only possible ones, however.
A far more optimistic scenario would recognize that improved counterterrorism efforts need not come at the expense of violent crime
enforcement at the local level. And it would have the federal government court the assistance of state and local governments by giving
them a greater voice in how the federal government interacts with
citizens, and particularly with immigrant communities.
The ability of the local police to mediate between federal needs and
community sensitivities was highlighted when the Justice Department's
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call for interviews of certain Middle Eastern immigrants went out in
the wake of 9/11. As the police chief of Ann Arbor, Michigan, later
recounted, local leaders of the Arab-American community asked that
an officer from his force be present during these interviews (George
2001). In Dearborn, local police participated in the interviews, but they
made clear to the community that this was primarily a federal effort
and saw themselves as monitoring the feds (Thacher 2005, p. 659).
Later, in March 2003, the director of the American Arab Chamber of
Commerce in Dearborn noted how the local police department had
worked to win the Arab community's trust and how the FBI and other
federal law enforcement agencies had not done enough. He also noted
that after the war with Iraq had broken out, the Wayne County sheriff
had dispatched his forces to guard mosques (Gorman 2003). The particulars vary, but the point is universal. As a recent report by the Inspectorate of Constabulary in the United Kingdom noted, "One of the
key lessons to emerge from the investigation into the 11 th September
attacks has been the vital importance of extending the reach of the
national security agencies by further utilising the close links between
local police and the communities in which they work" (H.M.'s Inspectorate of Constabulary 2003, p. 16).
In our optimistic story, state and local agencies-and particularly
local police departments-will exact a toll from federal authorities, as
the price of gathering and supplying information. Because of current
fiscal constraints, the federal government will not pay in cash, but by
giving local police a larger voice in federal domestic intelligence policy
and in the architecture of what amounts to a new national police system. And that voice will transform the new national network, giving it
a far greater measure of accountability to the citizenry than would
otherwise be possible.
The touted benefits of federalism often just reflect the virtues of
managerial decentralization, and not necessarily of a genuinely federalist and "polycentric" system in which "leaders of the subordinate
units draw their power from sources independent of [the] central authority" (Rubin and Feeley 1994, p. 911). This is partly true here. Even
officials in a hypothetical monolithic "national police force" that had
prime responsibility for pursuing all violent and street crime would
think twice about using tactics that risked alienating chunks of the
population in their respective patrol sectors (at least to the extent that
they cared about enforcing the law in all neighborhoods). These are
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crimes that can be and are measured, with police performance judged
accordingly. The contribution that local police forces can make to domestic intelligence policy making and collection is thus related to the
nature of their "beat."
But the political contribution that police involvement can make to
federal counterterrorism efforts stems not just from their "informational accountability"-the obligation to deal with any community
from which they will need crime tips. It also reflects their greater electoral accountability. Police chiefs themselves are not generally elected,
but the mayors and county executives to whom they report are, as are
the chief prosecutors with whom they deal. Scrutiny of police performance by the local electorate, although hardly constant, regularly occurs. Decades of political focus on violent crime, coupled with increasing sophistication in the way crime fighting is assessed have put police
departments under an unprecedented degree of pressure to actually
achieve results. Although the precise contours of each department's
approach will vary, each has made vast strides, with considerable federal
encouragement in the 1990s, toward recognizing the essential connection between community relations and effective law enforcement (Kelling 1988; Skolnick and Bayley 1988; Scott 2000; Hickman and Reaves
2001).
To be sure, a lot of the revolution in policing has been rhetorical,
and in some departments, "community" or "problem-solving" policing
has been more a grants-writing strategy than an operational reality.
Still, deployment patterns really have changed, and police commanders
now look to community leaders not simply for tips on whom to arrest
but increasingly for guidance on how the police can best improve the
quality of life within a precinct. In community policing, the emphasis
is on establishing partnerships between the police and communities to
reduce crime and enhance security; problem-solving policing focuses
on the problems that lie behind criminal incidents (Moore 1992). Approaches can vary, with departments that have adopted a community
policing style more ready to share decision-making authority with the
community than those that, wary of committing themselves to ambitious social objectives, would restrict themselves to problem solving.
But either way, the last two decades have seen enormous and accelerating changes in the readiness of urban police forces to solicit and
address the concerns of the people they serve (Fridell and Wycoff
2004). And solicitude for the concerns of ethnic or racial minority
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groups-which are often majorities within a city or precinct-has increasingly become a nonnegotiable part of a police chiefs job description.
To some, the notion of police departments as bulwarks of civil liberties against federal encroachment might sound a bit odd. We are
accustomed to the idea that the federal government is responsible for
monitoring local abuses-stepping in with civil suits or civil rights
prosecutions whenever the locals are derelict in their attention to such
matters-not local monitoring of the feds (Livingston 1999). The rejoinder, of course, is that while we all have our idiosyncratic estimations
of the skills and predilections of each enforcement level, no level has
a monopoly of virtue. The obligation of local police departments to
combat violent crime and maintain order can push them toward aggressive and even abusive control tactics. Yet that same obligation
causes police departments to be especially attentive to the costs imposed by unsettling (or worse) interactions with the local community
that have little to do with their ordinary order maintenance or crimefighting responsibilities.
There have been signs of friction-particularly in the immigration
area-as intergovernmental relationships that used to be based on violent crime are pushed to accommodate the threat of terrorism. As a
recent white paper by the Police Executive Research Forum noted,
there is considerable room for cooperation between the local police
and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Davis and
Murphy 2004, p. 18). The dimensions of this interaction, however,
need to be a matter of negotiation, not federal fiat. Broadly tasking the
police with immigration work-as envisioned by the Bush administration and pending legislative proposals that would condition federal
funding for police departments on their commitment to immigration
enforcement (Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal
[CLEAR] Act of 2005, H.R. 3137, introduced June 23, 2005)-would
in all likelihood result in a net intelligence loss. In the neighborhoods
that could be the richest source of terrorist tips, it changes the beat
cop from peacekeeper to a potential source of personal ruin.
There also have been signs of real progress. Some have simply
emerged out of the recognition that what might previously have been
characterized as violent crime programs can be labeled counterterrorism programs, at least for funding purposes, without any disingenuity.
In May 2005, the Boston Police Commissioner announced her inten-
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tion to use federal homeland security money to train and fund a neighborhood watch network. "There's no bright line between terrorism and
ordinary inner-city crime," she explained. "Whether it's guns, gangs,
drugs, or terrorism, we're going to build whatever we do on the backbone of community policing" (Smalley 2005, p. B1). The move probably did not catch Washington by surprise. A recent Guide on Law
Enforcement Intelligence for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, commissioned by the Justice Department's COPS office, maintained that there did not have to be a trade-off between community policing and counterterrorism responsibilities and exhorted
that "it is time to maximize the potential for community-policing efforts to serve as a gateway of locally based information, to prevent
terrorism, and all other crimes" (Carter 2004, p. 40). And a former
COPS official advised police officials to "reinforce the fact that the
gathering and sharing of timely and accurate information depend on
strong partnerships between community residents and police. Defeating criminals and defeating terrorists is not an either-or situation"
(Scrivner 2004, p. 189).
Perhaps more significant, however, have been developments with
respect to intelligence sharing, in particular the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. This initiative was spearheaded by the IACP
as a response to the September 11 attacks. From the start, it received
strong federal backing. Yet its orientation was not limited to counterterrorism. Instead, the "vision" was one in which "state and local agencies are not merely adjuncts to a national strategy for improving intelligence communication, but founding partners of and driving
participants in any organization that helps coordinate the collection,
analysis, dissemination and use of criminal intelligence data in the
U.S." (IACP 2002, p. 2). Thereafter, planners sought to create "a nationally coordinated criminal intelligence council that would develop
and oversee a national intelligence plan" (National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 2003, p. iii). While it is far too early to assess (or
even detail) this initiative, the plan-which for now exists as a collection of separate programs-appears to promise a new era of collaboration among federal, state, and local agencies, and an infrastructure
within which the diverse political and operational concerns of local
departments can be raised and addressed (National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 2004).
It would be churlish to suggest that the police have extracted aid in
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their immediate criminal enforcement responsibilities as the price of
their counterterrorism efforts. After all, no responsible police official
wants to be on the sidelines of the War on Terror. Yet it is also difficult
to avoid seeing in this plan an effort by police officials to strategically
pivot off the federal interest in counterterrorism to address their own
local criminal enforcement responsibilities. Intelligence-led policing is
not an abstract concept, just an underdeveloped one, and one that is
fast becoming a focus of attention in modern departments (Cope 2004).
Even the police commander interested only in drugs and violent crime
can appreciate the benefits of sharing intelligence not just within his
department (sometimes a challenge enough) but with neighboring departments, and particularly with departments in areas that serious offenders visit, and so on. This is a mammoth job both organizationally
and technically, going far beyond the traditional data sharing of criminal records, license plates, and warrants. But the idea marks a return
to the federal role in criminal enforcement that a hopeful observer
might have envisioned in the early 1930s: as the sponsor, but not the
controller, of a platform for broad interjurisdictional cooperation in
the service of each participant's respective enforcement priorities.
A pilot program for the new network developed in a way that itself
shows the new local role. In late 2003, after the FBI appeared to have
pulled out of a counterterrorism information-sharing project in the
Puget Sound area, local officials set one up on their own, the Law
Enforcement Information Exchange. By May 2005, the Justice Department had thrown its full support behind the project, declaring it a
"regional pilot plan" and ordering all its agencies to share their investigative files with local police forces through the Exchange. The goal,
according to Deputy Attorney General James Comey, "is to ensure that
DOJ [Department of Justice] information is available for users at all
levels of government so that they can more effectively investigate, disrupt and deter criminal activity, including terrorism" (Shukovsky and
Barber 2003, p. Al; Shukovsky 2005, p. B4).
In another program encompassed by the National Plan (National
Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 2003, 47), the sequence was quite
different, with the feds taking the field first talking terrorism, but soon
leaving it for states to pursue under a more general crime-fighting
rationale. The Multi-state Anti-terrorism Information Exchange information sharing project (regrettably dubbed Matrix) was funded by the
federal government shortly after September !1 . Under the aegis of a
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private contractor, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and
the nonprofit Florida-based Institute for Intergovernmental Research,
the project sought to establish a massive database from a wide variety
of official and commercial sources, which participating states could
contribute to and draw on for terrorism and criminal investigations.
Initially thirteen states signed up. The program soon came under fire,
however, by privacy advocates concerned about the use and misuse of
a data repository of this magnitude, and it never got off the ground
nationwide (Krouse 2004). By May 2005, the project, and the federal
funding, had formally come to an end, with only four states remaining
in it. Florida and Ohio, however, continued the program, in part with
other federal money (Galnor 2005). And the stories that officials offered to justify their continued participation focused on violent crime:
Florida officials told how the system had helped identity a Tampa robbery suspect within hours, assisted in kidnapping investigations, and
helped crack a hitherto cold murder case. "Although Matrix was designed as a terrorism tool," the Florida official in charge of it noted,
"its main value has been for solving more ordinary crimes" (Galnor
2005; Kalfrin 2005; Royse 2005). An Ohio official noted that Matrix
had been used in the investigation of a sniper attacking motorists on
an interstate highway (Craig 2005). It remains to be seen whether this
program will expand to other states and in what form. Yet (barring an
escalation in the pace and scope of terrorist attacks), it seems safe to
predict that the primary rationale for it will be regular crime fightingwhich, at least outside New York City, remains the gold standard of
political justifications in this area.
There will be many kinks to work out as the federal interest in a
secure intelligence network is squared with demands for accountability
at the local level. One such conflict emerged in 2002-3 in Boise, Idaho.
There, the community ombudsman invoked his power, under a city
ordinance allowing him access to all police files, to look at files created
by a new police intelligence unit. This oversight effort, however, ran
afoul of federal intelligence-sharing guidelines that barred access to
non-law enforcement officers. Backed by Idaho's congressional delegation and the local U.S. attorney, the city unsuccessfully sought a
waiver from the Justice Department. The city council was thus left
with the choice of either demanding civilian access and precluding
membership in the federal intelligence network or giving up its chosen
mechanism for promoting civilian oversight (Orr 2002, 2003). Another
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conflict is playing out in Portland, Oregon, which has pulled its police
force out of the joint terrorism task force because federal officials
would not give city leaders the oversight powers they demanded. Without more oversight, the mayor asserted, he could not "guarantee that
Portland officers [would] obey state laws barring them from investigating people strictly because of their political or religious ties" (Griffin
2005, p. Al). How these sorts of issues will be resolved around the
country remains to be seen. One can cautiously expect intergovernmental negotiations to proceed fruitfully, however, between the gains
to localities of membership in the national network and the federal
interest in nationwide domestic intelligence capability, and as local governments use their congressional representatives to exert influence over
the feds under the now-sacred banner of "information sharing" (GAO
2003a).
Even were localities generally eager to participate in a national intelligence network, there would still need to be coordination at the
subnational level. One emerging trend is the readiness of state governments to rise to this challenge and to take on operational responsibilities that they never assumed when violent crime alone lay at the heart
of federal-local interaction (Farber 2004; Wickham 2004). In some
states, for example, state homeland security task forces have merged
with, and even supplanted, the local federal Attorney General Antiterrorism Advisory Council (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the
Inspector General 2005, p. 112). And state intelligence centers have
begun to "play an intermediary role, connecting state and local law
enforcement officers to the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center, CT
Watch, and local Joint Terrorism Task Forces" (National Academy of
Public Administration 2005, p. 38). An August 2004 survey by the
National Governors Association found that "92 percent of responding
states [thirty-eight of the fifty-five states and territories responded] either have completed, or are in the process of developing, a statewide
capacity to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence information,
most notably in the form of a state intelligence fusion center" (2005,
p. 5).
When states defended their control over LEAA or other block grant
programs, their claims to be adding value, in the form of coordination
and management, could fairly be challenged by the local governments
that shouldered most of the responsibility for policing. In the new post9/11 information-sharing era, however, states have a far more substan-
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tial role to play. If the choice for subnational coordinator lies between
regional centers run by the Department of Homeland Security and
fusion centers managed by state governments, the latter are more attractive. State views will not fully represent those of their urban instrumentalities, since their needs and burdens can be quite different.
The recent tension over immigration law enforcement makes that clear
enough. Nonetheless, states-which in any event are politically and
constitutionally indispensable-may end up providing ready-made politically accountable platforms to support the new architecture, in a
way that a new federal construct could not.

Ill. Conclusion
Perhaps the coming years will see the threat of terrorism recede and
violent crime (regardless of the rate at which it actually occurs) reclaim
its place at the heart of intergovernmental relationships in the law
enforcement area. Perhaps in the wake of future terrorist attacks, the
War on Terror will so dominate all government business that officials
at all levels will put aside all other concerns. If we continue on our
present trajectory, however, the developing equilibrium will fall far
short of either extreme. Spearheaded by the federal government, terrorism prevention efforts will continue and will become more institutionalized. Yet the institutions that develop will have to be largely
crafted from a system of federal, state, and local agencies that over the
past few decades made violent crime (and drugs) the primary focus of
their interactions.
There is a deep irony here: It is not at all clear that the federal
government had to commit itself to fighting violent crime in the later
part of the twentieth century. That commitment was certainly perceived by the congresses and presidential administrations that pursued
it as politically advantageous, and it probably was. Yet whether the
federal funding programs and operational initiatives that flourished between 1964 and 2001 actually reduced crime or, more precisely, reduced crime more than a very different allocation of money and enforcement resources would have is open to question. So is whether
crime reduction actually ought to be a federal goal. Since the September 11 attacks-followed by the 2004 attacks in the Madrid train station and the 2005 attacks in London-federal spending and enforcement priorities have showed signs of shifting away from violent crime
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in favor of counterterrorism efforts. Yet the federal government's need
to court state and local participation in these efforts and the threat that
such participation poses to those governments' traditional policing responsibilities may bind the feds to violent crime concerns-or at least
defer to state and local interests in this regard-to a far greater, and
less optional, extent than before. Now, the feds have less of a choice.
The United States has never had a "national police force" and, one
suspects, never will. But it does need a national police system. Sparked
by the September 11 attacks, one is indeed emerging. And it is emerging both from the top down and the bottom up. The feds are certainly
pushing from above under the rubric of counterterrorism. But the
progress from below, though it enhances federal counterterrorism efforts, has primarily been in the name of ordinary crime fighting. There
is no blinking the inherent tension between counterterrorism and
street crime enforcement strategies. With thoughtful consideration of
the demands of each priority, however, this tension need not be destructive and can in fact lead to a national intelligence and enforcement
network that is true to the political values of the nation it protects.
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